COP31: Shrinking space for adaptation

The second draft only kept the promise to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035 without putting any figures

 

By Unnati Singh 21 Nov. 2026
COP31: Shrinking space for adaptation

Visual Credits: Arkatapa Basu


Negotiators have spent more than two years agreeing on how to measure adaptation. But agreement on the money needed to make it happen remains elusive. India and its allies are now pushing the question back into the negotiations: who pays, how much, and on what terms?

The first draft of COP31’s main decision mentioned tripling adaptation finance,  reaching at least $120 billion. The draft also asked the UN’s Standing Committee on Finance to set the baseline using grant-equivalent accounting, which reflects the real value of support rather than counting loans at face value.

In the second iteration, both had disappeared. The revised draft kept the promise to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035, but asked the committee only to report on possible baselines next year. 

Belém: what was agreed, and what was left open

At COP30 in Belém, governments adopted 59 Belém Adaptation Indicators, narrowed down from around 10,000 suggestions, covering everything from water and health to finance and technology transfer. Over the next two years, the Belém–Addis Vision will develop guidance on using them while technical work refines their methods. The indicators are voluntary, are not meant for comparing countries and must never become conditions for accessing finance.

The money got far less precision. Belém called for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035, with no baseline, no common accounting method and no agreement on who pays what. Glasgow’s pledge at COP26 to double adaptation finance to around $40 billion by 2025 had the same weaknesses, and is likely to have been missed.

Bonn: where the talks broke down

The talks in Bonn in June 2026 were meant to set up a task force on the indicators’ methodologies. Instead, they broke down. 

The EU proposed 16 experts from UN agencies, with no direct government representation. Canada suggested up to 20 self-nominated experts. Most developing-country groups, from the African Group to the small island states, wanted governments to keep oversight. India’s priority was a government-led structure that would uphold the Belém safeguards, above all, that indicators must never become conditions for finance.

Finance was just as divisive. The EU, UK, Canada, Japan, Norway and Switzerland sought to remove references to tripling, arguing they belonged in the finance negotiations. India and its partners in the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs) pushed back: separating adaptation from the money to deliver it would weaken accountability. India also maintained that development-bank lending is no substitute for the grant-based support developed countries owe under Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement.

On the final day, the Chairs’ text dropped references to equity, weakened the finance provisions and excluded governments from the task force. The African Group, the Arab Group, the LMDCs and others rejected it, and the issue went to Antalya unresolved.

Antalya: the same argument, all over again

The African Group's request for a separate agenda item on tripling adaptation finance was set aside on the first day. The G77 and China wanted negotiations on the baseline, accounting method and tracking of the commitment to begin immediately. The EU, the Environmental Integrity Group and Japan argued that these discussions belonged in the climate finance negotiations instead.

The issue eventually found its way into the COP31 cover decision, where November 16’s apparent breakthrough lasted barely three days. By November 19, the revised draft had dropped the $120 billion figure and sent the question of how to implement the tripling commitment back to the finance work programme.

The reluctance to commit was not limited to this discussion. On national adaptation plans, the EU, Japan and Switzerland opposed reaffirming developed countries' obligations to provide financial support. On the Adaptation Fund, the EU and Switzerland resisted proposals for larger and more predictable contributions. This was particularly striking in a year when the Fund had missed its fundraising target for the third consecutive time.

International public finance for adaptation reached just $28–32 billion in 2024, only $1 billion more than in 2023. Yet UNEP’s 2026 Adaptation Gap Report estimates that developing countries will need around $305 billion every year by 2035, even before accounting for much of the investment required from the private sector.

How much tripling adaptation finance would actually deliver depends on the baseline countries choose. One calculation puts the annual amount at $85 billion by 2035; another puts it at $120 billion. That is a $35 billion difference depending on how the commitment is counted. Even the higher figure would cover less than a third of estimated adaptation needs.

The choice of baseline has real consequences; it determines how much developed countries will actually have to pay. It is difficult to take seriously the calls by developed countries for greater climate ambition from others when they themselves resist clear and measurable commitments to finance adaptation. Their position exposes a glaring contradiction between the ambition they demand and the responsibilities they are willing to accept.

India's case, and the harder questions

In India's national statement at COP31, Environment Minister Bhupender Yadav put it simply, "science is based on 'cause and effect'." Today's warming, he argued, is the consequence of two centuries of industrialisation by some countries. Developing countries should not be expected to bear those consequences at the expense of their own development.

Yadav was speaking primarily about mitigation, but the same argument applies to adaptation. Floods, droughts and heatwaves are already imposing high costs on countries that contributed relatively little to causing climate change. For a farmer facing another drought or a community rebuilding after a flood, the question is not how resilience is measured, but whether the resources exist to build it. India is therefore right to question a system that is becoming increasingly detailed about measuring adaptation progress without establishing equally clear commitments on financial support.

The terms of that support matter too. Flood defences and resilient health facilities rarely generate the revenue needed to repay commercial loans. If grants, concessional loans and other forms of finance are counted together without distinguishing their actual value, countries could meet a headline target on paper while the affordable finance on the ground remains short.

However, India's position on climate science is more complicated. In Bonn and Antalya, it resisted aligning the next IPCC assessment with the 2028 Global Stocktake, arguing that a compressed timetable could leave out research from the Global South. That concern is legitimate, but delay also risks depriving negotiators of important evidence, a worry raised by small island states. The next IPCC adaptation assessment will examine adaptation finance for the first time, making it particularly relevant to India's own argument. The challenge is to ensure that the science is both representative and timely.

What India should push for next

India's position carries greater weight because it is not negotiating alone. Through the LMDCs, it works alongside China and other developing countries. In Bonn, its call for government oversight also found support from the African Group, the Arab Group and Grupo Sur. Maintaining this unity will become more important as developed countries push emerging economies, including China, to take on a greater role in climate finance. 

India and its partners will need to hold their ground on the distinction between developed countries' obligations under Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement and the broader question of who else might contribute. Before COP32, they should agree on a common position on the amount of adaptation finance needed, how it should be counted and how its delivery should be monitored.

  1. Treat $120 billion as a floor, not a ceiling: The $120 billion figure is itself a compromise: it simply triples the $40 billion commitment agreed upon at Glasgow. Even if delivered in full, it would meet less than 40% of estimated adaptation needs. Developing countries have already had to settle for a $300 billion climate finance goal at Baku, against calls for more than $1 trillion. They should not allow the adaptation commitment to be diluted further. The $120 billion should be treated as a minimum, with a clear pathway to increase support as needs grow.

  2. Count the money honestly: The headline figure alone will tell us little about the actual support reaching developing countries. The Standing Committee on Finance should report the grant-equivalent value of finance provided, distinguishing between grants, concessional loans, private finance and other sources. Without a common method, countries can claim progress towards the same target while counting very different forms of support.

  3. Use existing reports to hold contributors to account: There is already a basis for monitoring delivery. Developed countries report planned climate finance every two years under Article 9.5, while finance provided is also reported through the transparency framework. These reports should be assessed against an agreed pathway for tripling adaptation finance, with interim milestones before 2035. The first biennial progress report on the new finance goal, due in 2028, offers an opportunity to bring this information together and assess whether commitments are translating into actual support.

  4. Give the Baku Adaptation Roadmap a practical purpose: The roadmap's workshops already cover access to finance, technology transfer and capacity-building. Rather than becoming another parallel discussion, they should identify where shortages of finance and technical support are holding back adaptation. Their findings should feed into the review of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience, helping connect the indicators agreed at Belém with the resources needed to act on them.

  5. Close ranks behind Africa’s number: The $120 billion demand has been championed by the African Group and least developed countries. India and the LMDCs should support it rather than allow developed countries to portray the developing world as divided over the scale of the commitment. Such support should extend beyond the headline figure to the terms on which finance is provided, its predictability and whether countries can actually access it. The obligation under Article 9.1 remains with developed countries, and a united developing-country position would help keep that responsibility in focus.

The real test is delivery

Whether Antalya restores a figure or postpones the question again, the underlying imbalance remains. A financial commitment is only as credible as the rules for measuring its delivery. And an adaptation framework is only as useful as the resources countries have to act on what it reveals. India and its partners have made a compelling case that adaptation cannot be separated from the finance needed to deliver it. The next task is to turn that argument into a commitment that can be measured, scrutinised and honoured. The world has agreed on how to assess progress on resilience. It is time to be equally clear about who will help pay for it.

Unnati Singh currently works as a sustainability consultant with Universal Postal Union. She formerly worked with the UNDP and MoEFCC. Views expressed are personal

Edit: Bhasker Tripathi, Shaswata Kundu Chaudhuri

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Unnati Singh

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