India’s carbon market is going live; its financial system can’t see it

Gaps in accounting, corporate disclosures and regulation could leave lenders and investors unable to assess the financial risks and opportunities the market creates

 

By Sagar Asapur19 Nov. 2026
India’s carbon market is going live; its financial system can’t see it

Visual Credits: Riddhi Tandon


India’s carbon market is about to involve real money. Carbon credit certificates (CCCs) under the Carbon Credit Trading Scheme are expected to begin trading on the power exchanges shortly. Some 490 industrial units now carry binding emission-intensity targets, and draft targets for 255 steel plants are in the pipeline. Abroad, India has signed Article 6 agreements with Japan and South Korea, and carbon markets are again on the agenda at COP31, now under way in Antalya.

Carbon is becoming a balance-sheet item for Indian companies: a cost when they miss a target, an asset when they beat it and, for project developers, potentially an export. Yet India’s accounting, disclosure and data systems do not capture it consistently. A bank lending to a cement major, or a mutual fund holding a refinery, will find it hard to judge how exposed that company is based on public information.

The sums are not trivial, even at launch. Assuming a price of about USD 10 a tonne, Climate Risk Horizons estimated in July that buying credits to cover 2026-27 shortfalls would cost India’s five largest steelmakers about 7 per cent of their 2024-25 profits, and SAIL about 15 per cent. As targets tighten, as they must, companies that lag will face larger shortfalls, likely at higher prices. Inaction on decarbonisation will mean that exposure grows every time targets are tightened.

That exposure comes in two tiers. The first is a compliance cost: a company that misses its target must cover the shortfall by surrendering certificates, banked or bought at the market price. The second is a penalty: a company that fails to surrender enough pays environmental compensation at twice the average traded price. The first rises with the carbon price; the second arises only on non-compliance, which a lender should read as a warning sign. 

Lenders meet this exposure at four points: reading a borrower’s accounts, monitoring its risk, labelling a loan green, or financing a carbon project. At each point, they hit a gap. 

Accounting: India has no dedicated, comprehensive guidance on accounting for CCCs that companies earn, buy or bank, or for the obligation to surrender them. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India’s (ICAI) 2012 guidance covers only Kyoto-era Clean Development Mechanism credits. Companies can apply general accounting principles, but without specific guidance, similar positions may be recorded differently. Tax is also unclear: the 10 per cent rate on carbon-credit income in section 194 of the Income-tax Act, 2025 refers to UNFCCC-validated credits, which may exclude domestic CCCs. A lender comparing two cement borrowers cannot be sure it is comparing like with like.

Data: To place a borrower in the right tier, a lender needs four numbers: its target, its verified intensity, the certificates it holds and its expected shortfall. Only the target is routinely public. Plant emissions per tonne of product, company emissions per rupee of revenue and national emissions per unit of GDP serve different purposes. The problem is the missing bridge between them. SEBI’s BRSR Core asks listed companies for company-level emissions per rupee of revenue, adjusted for purchasing power parity, and per unit of output they define themselves. An investor cannot readily connect a company’s scheme target to its BRSR disclosure, its absolute emissions or its financial exposure. To make matters more confusing, the methodology behind the sectoral targets has not been made public.

Claims: Under offset rules issued by the Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE), credits from activities outside the government’s Article 6 list may be sold abroad without a “corresponding adjustment” and continue to count towards India’s own target. That is legitimate in itself: such credits finance mitigation without the same tonne being counted against two national targets. The risk lies in what buyers claim with them, and the same applies at home. Indian companies buy voluntary credits to support net-zero claims, but BRSR Core does not ask them to disclose the volume, vintage, standard or adjustment status of those credits. Without that, ESG funds and green lenders cannot test the claims they rely on.

Bankability: CCCs have a statutory basis under the Energy Conservation Act, and Central Electricity Regulatory Commission’s (CERC) 2026 regulations govern their trading. The law does not yet settle whether certificates can be pledged, how that security is enforced, or how they are treated in insolvency. For Article 6, the government has not published a process, timeline or revocation rule for authorising credits. These gaps need not stop financing, but they raise its cost.

A new handbook for senior officials, from the Climate Vulnerable Forum’s V20 finance ministers and the Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative (VCMI), asks host governments to estimate how much mitigation they can safely export. For India, that figure can be modelled from GDP and emissions projections and the NDC’s capacity and forest-sink targets, but none has been published. Financiers pricing Indian credits are left to make their own estimates.

None of this requires India to change its climate targets. It requires the financial system to catch up with the market the government has built. Five steps would help: 

(i) The ICAI and the Ministry of Corporate Affairs should issue guidance on accounting for CCCs, surrender obligations and internationally transferred credits. 

(ii) BEE and the scheme’s registry, Grid Controller of India, should publish plant-level verified emissions, issuances and surrenders annually

(iii) SEBI should add carbon credit use to BRSR Core and ask covered companies to reconcile their scheme performance with their reported emissions

(iv) The Finance Ministry should clarify the legal nature of CCCs, including their use as collateral, and their income tax and GST treatment

(v) The Reserve Bank of India, whose climate-risk disclosure rules for lenders were reportedly put on hold this year, should at least ask banks to factor rising compliance costs into credit assessments of covered borrowers.

At COP31, India will rightly defend its development space. At home, the more urgent task is less glamorous: making carbon visible on balance sheets. A market that finance cannot see is a market that cannot move finance. 

 

Sagar Asapur is the Head of Sustainable Finance at Climate Risk Horizons. The views are the author’s own.

Edit: Bhasker Tripathi, Production: Shaswata Kundu Chaudhuri

Share

LinkedInXFacebook

About the Author

Sagar Asapur